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attention to misconceptions and misunderstandings regarding the hypothesized U.S.-led
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1. Introduction
China had been the world’s second largest carbon emitter behind the U.S. for years. On
the trends of the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2004)
estimated that China’s CO2 emissions would not catch up with those of the U.S. until
2030. China’s energy use has surged, however, since the turn of this century, almost
doubling between 2000 and 2007. Despite similar rates of real economic growth, the rate
of growth in China’s energy use during this period was more than twice that of the last
two decades of the twentieth century (NBS, 2009). As a result, China became the world’s
largest carbon emitter in 2007, instead of being number two ‘until 2030’ as estimated as
late as 2004.
Confronted with rampant environmental pollution problems and health risks, and
rising greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting climate change, the mounting challenge
for China is how to keep its energy consumption and CO2 emissions under control while
sustaining its rapid economic growth (Zhang, 2010a and 2011b). Another enormous
challenge that China needs to deal with is a huge increase in its oil imports, which is
accompanying its rapid economic growth and the resulting carbon emissions. This has
raised great concern about China’s energy security because its rapidly increasing oil
imports come mainly from politically unstable regions and are shipped through lengthy
sea lanes over which China has little influence. Given that global oil markets are very
volatile and China’s incremental oil demand dwarfs that of any other single country,
China’s responses to growing energy security concerns have been brought into the
spotlight. In this context, China’s global quest for resources, in particular oil and natural
gas, has received unprecedented worldwide attention and scrutiny. This is partly because
of China’s own high-profile, active state diplomacy and its national oil companies’
acquisitions in the key exporting regions of oil and natural gas. But, in my view, the
stakes are raised unnecessarily high mainly because of the growing politicization of
Chinese energy security as a result of misconceptions and misunderstandings of China’s
quest for energy security both inside and outside China. Inside China, these relate to the
perceived U.S.-led oil blockade against China and China’s illusion that its investments in
oil fields overseas are able to help strengthen its energy security. Western political
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rhetoric characterizes China’s efforts to secure energy supplies overseas as a major threat.
That rhetoric further intensifies China’s mistrust of global oil markets, sparking fears that
the energy establishment will seek to deny China’s access to the oil it needs for
development. Outside China, there are wide misconceptions and misunderstandings of
how Chinese policy banks operate and their oil and natural gas-based loans. China’s
loans are often misrepresented as asking borrowers to sell a fixed quantity of oil to China
during the contract period at a predetermined price so that China can capture windfall
gains as oil prices rise.
This paper aims to de-politicize the debate on China’s global quest for energy
resources and to put discussions on that issue into perspective. To that end, the paper first
categorizes the main features of China’s energy mix and discusses why energy security in
China equates to a large extent to oil security. The paper then pays special attention to
misconceptions and misunderstandings regarding the hypothesized U.S.-led ‘oil
blockade’ against China; the Chinese policy banks and their oil and natural gas-based
loans; and the role of Chinese investments in oil and gas fields overseas in discussions on
China’s global quest for energy resources. Finally, the paper ends with some concluding
remarks on a more constructive way forward

2. Energy security in the Chinese context
China’s energy security issue cannot be well understood without a better understanding
of its energy mix. This section will categorize the main features of China’s energy mix
and discuss why energy security in China equates to a large extent to oil security.

2.1 Main reliance on domestic energy resources
China is self-sufficient in energy. Even in the 1950s when oil was almost completely
imported, 97% of energy supply was still from domestic sources (Zhang, 1998). China’s
energy balance was also unaffected by the first rise in world oil prices. China is indeed a
large energy consumer. With rapid economic growth fueled by increasing energy
consumption, China is now the world’s largest energy consumer, with an increasing
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dependence on imported oil. At the same time, however, China is also the world’s largest
energy producer. With total domestic primary energy production of 2960 million tons of
coal equivalent (mtce)2 and total domestic energy consumption of 3250 mtce in 2010
(Hua, 2011), domestic supply provides about 91% of the total energy consumption in
China, meaning that overall energy dependence (namely, the ratio of the energy that a
country imports to the total it consumes) is about 9%. With a variety of policies and
investments in place that will further expand domestic supply capacity, China will
continue to rely mainly on domestic supply to meet its growing energy demand in the
future.

2.2 Heavy reliance on coal as a major source of energy
A country’s choice of fuels and technologies depends to a large extent on its resource
endowments and their relative prices. China is abundant in coal resources (British
Petroleum, 2011). This abundant supply of coal and its relatively lower price compared
with its more environmentally friendly substitutes make China far more reliant on coal
for its primary energy needs than any other major economies. As the world’s largest coal
producer and consumer, China produces and consumes about twice as much coal as the
U.S., the world number two, and China was responsible for almost half of global coal
consumption in 2010 (U.S. EIA, 2011a). Coal has accounted for over two-thirds of
China’s primary energy consumptions for several decades. For a considerable period of
time to come, China’s energy mix will remain dominated by coal (Zhang, 1990; IEA,
2010 and 2011).
China displaced Japan as the world’s top coal importer in 2011, a position Japan
had held since at least 1975. This raised concerns about whether China can meet its own
coal demand. In my view, this is an over-interpretation. China imported 182.4 million
tons of coal in 2011. That is a very small amount when compared with China’s total coal
consumption. The move into the position of number-one importer can be attributed to
some special factors. On the Japanese side, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant
2

China still uses mtce as its benchmark, whereas the international standard has moved
towards oil equivalents (mtoe). Multiplying mtce by 1.43 will convert to mtoe.
4
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper699

4

Zhang: Why Are the Stakes So High? Misconceptions and Misunderstand

accident in Japan on 11 March 2011 led to a power shortage. This, combined with strong
Japanese currency appreciation, led to slack demand for coking coal as steelmakers
curbed production. Moreover, as the magnitude 9.0 earthquake damaged coal-fired power
plants along the country’s northeast coast, this led to a reduction in Japan’s imports of
thermal coal used for power generation. On the Chinese side, with robust demand for coal
for power generation and cement production and rising costs of domestic coal production,
foreign coal was particularly attractive to those regions far away from domestic coal
production bases (Tsukimori, 2012).

2.3 Imports of natural gas set to rise, but much less concerning than the oil situation
Since 2006 China has been an importer of natural gas. China’s imports of natural gas are
set to increase as its overall energy consumption rises. China hopes to expand its
domestic natural gas output to 150-180 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year by 2020, while
imports would amount to 120-150 bcm/year (Oxford Analytica, 2012). Even by then, its
gas dependence rate is much less than that of oil. Moreover, the majority of natural gas is
used for chemical feedstock and power generation in China. There are a number of
alternatives to natural gas for those uses. Furthermore, China’s unconventional gas
reserves suggest that gas use can expand faster than expected without creating huge new
import dependency. According to the U.S. EIA (2011b), China is believed to have the
world’s third largest coalseam gas reserves, and 1275 trillion cubic feet (or 36 trillion
cubic meters) of recoverable shale gas reserves, the largest in the world.3 China has
significantly increased its expectations for unconventional gas production, announcing in
February 2012 a plan to invest 116.6 billion yuan to raise coalseam gas production to 30
bcm/year by 2015, up from 15 bcm/year in 2010. Expectations regarding shale gas output
range from 15-30 bcm/year to 60-100 bcm/year by 2020 (NDRC et al., 2012; Oxford
Analytica, 2012). If unconventional gas production meets even the lower bound of
expectations, this will significantly cut China’s imports of natural gas and its future
dependence rate.
3

China’s own estimate puts its recoverable shale gas reserves at 25 trillion cubic meters
(NDRC et al., 2012).
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China’s attempts to achieve commercial scale of shale gas production have,
however, so far been hindered by the lack of expertise and difficult geology. China’s
shale is situated in deeper and more difficult terrain than North American formations.
Moreover, Chinese companies have struggled to master the hydraulic fracturing and
horizontal drilling techniques used to exploit these resources. To that end, Chinese
national oil companies (NOCs) establish strategic partnerships with other NOCs and
international oil companies (IOCs) to gain technical know-how in areas where Chinese
NOCs lack technical expertise. PetroChina, a Hong Kong-listed unit of China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), bought in February 2012 a 20% stake in Shell’s
Groundbirch natural gas development in northeastern British Columbia, hoping to gain
shale gas experience from Shell (Welsch and Lee, 2012). In January 2012, China
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, known as Sinopec, signed a deal with Devon
Corporation to invest US$ 2.2 billion for a one-third stake in five U.S. shale and oil-andgas fields controlled by Devon (Xinhua, 2012). China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) is working with TOTAL in Nigeria’s Akpo and Egina deep-water fields (Jiang
and Sinton, 2011). PetroChina partnered with Shell in March 2010 to acquire a 100%
stake of Australian coalbed methane producer Arrow Energy. The recent flurry of
Chinese NOCs’ deal-making is more about gaining access to technology than the
commodity itself so that Chinese NOCs will be better positioned to explore and develop
similar resources (deep-water reserves, coalbed methane, and shale gas) within China.
Moreover, to achieve the aforementioned ambitious target for shale gas from
virtually zero in 2012, China allows foreign partners in this sector. In March 2012, Royal
Dutch Shell PLC and CNPC signed the first production-sharing contract to explore,
develop and produce shale gas in China. This deal marks a milestone in the development
of China’s shale gas reserves and fits in with China’s overall strategy to bring technical
and operational know-how to the development of its untapped reserves of shale gas.
Under the agreement, Shell will apply its advanced technology, operational expertise and
global experience to jointly develop shale gas with CNPC over a 3,500 square-kilometer
area in the Fushun-Yongchuan block in the Sichuan Basin (W. Ma, 2012). This pact will
serve as a template showing how production-sharing contracts between foreign and
domestic companies might work to help China tap this unconventional fuel.

6
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2.4 Increasing dependence on imported oil and China’s concerns about the Strait of
Malacca
China’s appetite for oil has been soaring over the past two decades. Its oil demand grew
from 2.3 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 1990 to 4.4 mbpd in 2000 (IEA, 2000). By
2010, China’s demand had jumped to 8.9 mbpd (IEA, 2011). The IEA (ibid) estimates
that by 2035, China’s oil demand will reach 14.9 mbpd, overtaking the US (14.5 mbpd)
as the largest oil consumer in the world.
China was self-sufficient in oil for most of the 60-old year history of the People’s
Republic, but since 1993 it has been a net oil importer. China’s economic boom and its
stagnating domestic production of oil have produced a growing hunger for imports. As of
2003, China emerged as second only to the U.S. in terms of oil imports. In 2009, China
imported 4.3 mbpd, or 51.3% of its demand (IEA, 2010). This was the first instance in
which China imported more than half of its oil needs. According to China’s National
Energy Administration, China’s oil dependence rate increased further to 56.5% in 2011
(Zhong, 2012). According to China’s General Administration of Customs, China’s oil
imports cost the country US$196.7 billion in 2011, accounting for 11.3% of its total
import expenditures (Ma, 2012; Zhong, 2012).
China is projected to maintain oil production close to the current level of 4.1
mbpd to 2025, followed by a steady decline as resource depletion sets in (IEA, 2011). As
a result its oil imports will continue to soar in the decades ahead. The IEA estimates that
by 2035, China will be importing nearly 12.6 mbpd (IEA, 2011), more than the U.S.
imports today, in order to meet its expected oil demand of 14.9 mbpd. This puts China’s
oil dependence rate at 84.6% in 2035 (IEA, 2011). China will thus become far more
exposed to the risk of international supply disruptions than it is today. Energy security
has risen to the height of importance in its foreign policy, and is becoming what has been
called a “transforming” factor in the relations between China and the Middle East, Russia,
and energy-rich Central Asian, African and Latin American countries (Yi, 2005).
Indeed, China’s oil dependence rate is already high and increasing. However, this
needs not to be viewed in a solely negative way. As a country’s overall trade intensity
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(defined as a ratio of the sum of imports plus exports to GDP) suggests, the higher ratio
means that country is more integrated with the global economy. It does not necessarily
suggest increased economic insecurity of that country. Moreover, many large economies
have even higher oil dependence rates than China, although China naturally stands out in
terms of the sheer quantity of its requirements. Furthermore, China itself experienced
complete dependence on foreign oil prior to the discoveries of the late 1950s. In the post
Civil War period China was geopolitically isolated, and it had to import essentially all of
its oil. Taking these points together, the oil dependence rate alone is insufficient to
determine the true level of energy security/insecurity of a country. To evaluate energy
security of a country properly, this factor has to be combined with other factors. They
include sources and routes of oil supply. Specifically, we need to look at
–

whether oil imports concentrate on a few countries—more diversified
sources of supply are obviously preferred;

–

whether the main oil-exporting countries are political stable; and

–

whether the transport routes for oil imports are considered vulnerable to
physical disruption and how much influence the importer has on these
lanes.

As shown in Figure 1, in 1995, China relied mainly on the Middle East and
Southeast Asia (mainly Indonesia, which alone accounted for nearly one-third of China’s
total imports) for 82% of its crude oil imports. The Middle East was – and is - clearly
vital. Thus, China will continue to consolidate its base there. In the recent years though,
China has also turned its attention to the emerging oil and gas fields of Africa. Top
Chinese leaders frequently paid visits to oil-producing countries in the region. This highprofile, goodwill-based energy diplomacy has helped China make remarkable inroads in
striking energy deals with oil-rich African countries (Zhang, 2007 and 2010b). By 2005,
this strategy enabled China to significantly diversify its import mix. As shown in Figure 1,
Africa accounted for 30% of China’s oil imports in 2005, up from 7% in 1995, while
Russia supplied 10% of total imports, up from less than 1% ten years earlier (Downs,
2006).
China became slightly more reliant on the Middle East in 2005 than it had been
10 years ago, with 47% of its imports coming from the Persian Gulf. In addition, because
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China is now heavily reliant on Africa as well as the Middle East, it now depends more
on a single chokepoint - the Strait of Malacca - than it had before, with nearly 77% of its
oil imports flowing through the Strait. This situation remains unchanged in the following
five years: China still imported 78% of its crude from the Middle East and Africa in 2010
(British Petroleum, 2011; Kennedy, 2011).

Russia & Central
Asia, 0.2%
Others, 10.5%

South America,
3.4%
Others, 4.0%

South America,
0.0%

Russia & Central
Asia, 11.1%

SE Asia, 7.4%
SE Asia, 38.8%

Middle East,
47.2%
Middle East,
43.3%
Africa, 30.2%
Africa, 7.2%

Figure 1 China’s crude oil imports by region in 1995 (left) and 2005 (right)

Foreign trade has become one of the pillars underpinning China’s phenomenal
economic growth over the past three decades, and oil is intimately related to it. Given that
most crude oil imports from the Middle East and Africa have to pass through the Strait of
Malacca, the Strait of Malacca is of immense strategic and economic importance to
China’s economic and energy security. As a chokepoint, this Strait directly affects
China’s sea lane of communications, but China has little direct influence over it.
Therefore, China has every reason to be concerned about the safe and smooth passage of
its shipments. Beijing feels susceptible to this strategic weakness. Any adverse event in
the Strait would disrupt its trade flows and particularly oil imports, which could deal a
further blow to China’s economic development, social stability and military capability
(Chen, 2010; Zhao, 2007).

9
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Clearly, oil poses a unique challenge for China, not only because its oil
dependence rate is already high and continues to rise, but also, more importantly, because
oil imports come from less politically stable regions and have to be shipped to China via
routes that are considered vulnerable to physical disruption but which China has little
physical sway over. Viewed in this context, energy security in China to a large extent
equates to oil security.

3. Putting China’s global search for energy security into perspective

Over the past few years top Chinese leaders have come to view the Strait of Malacca as a
strategic vulnerability (Blumenthal, 2008; Holmes, 2007). In November 2003, President
Hu Jintao declared that “certain major powers” were bent on controlling the Strait and
called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability.
Thereafter, the Chinese press devoted considerable attention to the country’s “Malacca
dilemma” (Lanteigne, 2008; Storey, 2006). China Youth Daily, a leading Chinese
newspaper, declared that: “It is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Strait of
Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China” (Shi, 2004).
Given the strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca and China’s lack of
influence on the waterway, China has made great efforts on both the demand and supply
sides to cope with the perceived “Malacca dilemma” and to enhance its energy security.
On the demand side, China has taken considerable efforts to control the growth of
its demand for energy and oil and thus its demand for oil imports. For the first time,
China has incorporated an input indicator as a constraint in its five-year economic plan –
requiring that energy use per unit of GDP be cut by 20% during the 11th five-year period
running from 2006 to 2010. This formal acknowledgement is widely considered to be an
important step towards building a “harmonious society” through “scientific development”.
Just prior to the Copenhagen climate change summit, China further pledged to cut its
carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels in order to help to reach an
international climate change agreement at Copenhagen or beyond (see Zhang, 2010a and
2011a,b for further discussion). Meeting these energy and carbon intensity targets will
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not only help to limit the growth of China’s carbon emissions, but also will reduce China’s
growing hunger for foreign oil, leave more oil on the market and thus help to stabilize the world
oil prices.

On the supply side, China has instituted a variety of policies to address its
growing dependence on imported oil. The country has made considerable efforts to
maintain domestic production close to the current level. In the meantime, China has been
making significant efforts to support the expansion of its own NOCs (the so-called goingout policy); to diversify both sources and routes of its oil supply, including setting up a
string of refineries in China through joint ventures with partners from energy-rich
countries that often come with supply agreements; to develop its own strategic petroleum
reserves; and to strengthen its naval capabilities to protect supply lines (Chen, 2010;
Jiang and Sinton, 2011; Kennedy, 2011; Wang and Wu, 2011; Zhang, 2007, 2010b and
2011c). Clearly, China has resorted to these unilateral and bilateral measures to enhance
its energy security and cope with the Malacca dilemma.
In this context, China’s global quest for resources, in particular oil and natural gas,
has received unprecedented worldwide attention and scrutiny. This is partly because of
China’s high-profile energy diplomacy and some debatable issues about the management
and operation of Chinese NOCs. But, in my view, this is mainly because of
misconceptions and misunderstandings of China’s quest for energy security both inside
and outside China. Inside China, these relate to the hypothesized U.S.-led oil blockade
against China and the role of Chinese investments in oil fields overseas. Outside China,
misconceptions and misunderstandings mainly relate to how Chinese policy banks
operate and their oil and natural gas-based loans. The following section seeks to clarify
each of these points.

3.1 An American-led oil blockade against China?
The strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca to China on the one hand and its lack of
influence on the waterway on the other have raised concerns about the threat of a U.S.led oil blockade against China.
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As mentioned in the preceding section China has made great efforts at both the
demand and supply sides to cope with the perceived “Malacca dilemma” and to enhance
its energy security. One of the significant efforts on the supply side is to support the
expansion of its own national oil companies abroad through the so-called going-out
policies and thus to increase the NOCs’ overseas oil production. If Chinese NOC’s
overseas oil production is to help to improve China’s energy security, then oil produced
needs to be shipped back to China. But, if the threat of a U.S.-led blockade is the concern,
then sending Chinese NOCs’ equity oil shares back home faces the same blockade
problem.
As the sole superpower, the U.S. is certainly reluctant to see and accept the rise of
China and is wary of any prospective challenge to its hegemony. Geopolitically, the U.S.
has attempted to contain China’s increasing world’s influence. As the U.S. withdraws
from its two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and refocuses on the Asia-Pacific region,
its “strategic pivot” to Asia has so far mainly manifested itself in a shoring up of its
‘encircling alliances’ with the countries on China’s periphery (The Economist, 2012a).
Auctioning a policy that would inhibit the Chinese economy is, however, highly unlikely,
because the world’s two largest economies are too integrated and interdependent for one
to fail. It would be a self-immolating policy. The U.S.’ attempt to influence, but not
intervene, in the recent Taiwan presidential election to avoid instability in the Taiwan
Strait clearly supports this view. In the last week or so running up the election in January
2012, the opposition party’s presidential candidate was running neck and neck with the
ruling party’s nominee. The opposition party was against the 1992 consensus that aims
for a peaceful unification of mainland China and Taiwan and if its candidate was elected
to the presidency, the U.S. could easily see that the outcome could lead to instability. So,
at the last moment, current and formal top U.S officials were in Taiwan, disregarding the
opposition party’s demand to keep political neutrality, which had been the stance that the
U.S. had taken in the previous Taiwanese elections. Instead, these U.S. officials explicitly
persuaded the voters to treasure the current stability in cross-strait relations, which was
clearly viewed to the ruling party’s advantage.
Some might take the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade
agreement--essentially a free-trade pact currently under negotiation among the U.S.,
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Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam, as a
counterargument. But I do not share the view that the U.S. is using the TPP to isolate
China economically. Rather, I see that the U.S. wants to use the TPP to press China to
observe the rules of the road on trade and intellectual property. The U.S. also wants to
use the TPP to achieve the major goal of leveling the playing field in which private and
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compete.4 This goal reflects the serious U.S. frustration
with what it sees as unfair advantages that Chinese SOEs have in world trade (Bussey,
2012; Davis, 2011).
Even if the U.S. were to attempt a blockade, it would probably not be very
successful (Collins and Murray, 2008), and would be extremely difficult to operate in
practice. If the blockade operations were undertaken close to China, blockading vessels
would be vulnerable to attacks from China. By contrast, if the blockade were
implemented far from China’s shores, it would be extremely difficult to differentiate oil
that was bound for China from oil that was bound for other countries, not only because
oil carried in a given tanker can be bound for several countries, but also because
ownership of the oil within that tanker can easily change during the course of its journey
(Kennedy, 2011).
Taking these points together, it is safe to say that the threat of a U.S.-led oil
blockade against China is largely a chimera. If this blockade is unlikely to happen, and
even if attempted has a low chance of success then it seems strange that China’s energy
security policy should take it as such a serious potential threat.
It is undeniable that the Western powers have gained control over the best oil
fields available, and as a late entrant to the international oil game, China has little choice
but to strike deals with the so-called rogue states, and to take risks to make acquisitions in

4

There is a challenge for the U.S. to come up with a position on state-owned firms
because the U.S. proposal could be used against the U.S. Postal Service, Tennessee
Valley Authority and other state-owned or state-controlled entities. The U.S. also bought
a controlling interest in General Motors during the financial crisis. While Democrats on
the House Ways and Means Committee in a letter to the White House in June 2011 said
that other free trade agreements had exceptions for “prudential measures taken to ensure
the integrity and stability of the financial system.”, U.S. trading partners could see an
exception of that sort as justifying a variety of aid to their state-owned firms (Davis,
2011).
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oil-rich but politically unstable countries or regions (Zhang, 2007 and 2010b). That
explains why Chinese NOCs are actively bidding for assets in West Africa and Latin
America. In my view, however, in their course of action and in the expansion of their
overseas business, Chinese NOCs exacerbate the extent of potential disruption to oil
supply. And in the name of energy security, Chinese NOCs are complicating China’s
foreign relations in sensitive regions of the world. This could potentially hijack Chinese
government’s going-out policies, as the NOCs prioritise their own profits but at the
potential expense of China’s overall national interests.

3.2 The operations of Chinese policy banks
During the 1994 reforms of the financial sector, the Chinese government created the
China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China as “policy banks”
(Bräutigam, 2009). Their loans would explicitly support the government’s policy
objectives. The creation of designated policy banks would theoretically free commercial
banks from policy lending and hold them accountable for rational, market-based lending.
The two policy banks provide lines of credit to Chinese NOCs and foreign entities,
mainly NOC counterparts, to support international expansion and secure oil or natural gas
deals. As shown in Table 1, since 2009, CDB has extended lines of credit totaling almost
US$85 billion to national energy companies and government entities in Brazil, Ecuador,
Russia, Turkmenistan and Venezuela (Downs, 2011b).
There is a widespread perception that the CDB provided these loans exclusively
to advance Chinese government policy objectives without commercial concerns. Contrary
to this popular view, the CDB is not a mere puppet of the Chinese government. It is
wholly state owned, but it is not state run.
To be sure, the CDB has a mission to advance the Chinese government’s policy
objectives at home and abroad, including securing oil and natural gas supplies, but that
mission to serve the interests of the Chinese government does not prevent it from
pursuing its own agenda to expand its business at home and abroad and pursue profits. In
fact, the CDB is successful at balancing commercial and policy priorities so that it has
high profits and a balance sheet that is even healthier than all other major Chinese
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commercial banks.5 Its non-performing loans ratio has stood below 1% since 2005, lower
than that of all other major Chinese commercial banks. It lends at market-based interest
rates. The interest rates on the lines of credit totaling US$ 45.6 billion extended to
Petrobras, Rosneft and Transneft in 2009 and to Venezuela’s Bank of Economic and
Social Development in 2010 are all based on the benchmark London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR), although the spread over LIBOR in Table 1 might be thinner than what a
Western bank would require (Downs, 2011b).
The CDB has been vocal in mobilizing China’s massive foreign reserves to
support cross-border energy and natural resource deals. Chen Yuan, its governor, was
quoted as saying that investing in energy and minerals is a good way to hedge against a
declining dollar and rising commodity prices, and thus serves as a medium for shifting
China’s foreign exchange reserves away from low-yielding financial instruments (Downs,
2011a). So the CDB made huge loans to resource-rich countries in Russia, Central Asia,
West Africa and Latin America. China’s loan commitments of US$37 billion in 2010 to
Latin America were more than the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and
the United States Export-Import Bank combined for that year.

5

There are at least the two factors for its success. Under the leadership of its governor
Chen Yuan, the CDB brought the lender’s risk management system up to global
standards, even rejecting loans to projects approved by the powerful National
Development and Reform Commission (Downs, 2011a). Jacob Frenkel, Chairman of
JPMorgan Chase International and a former governor of the Bank of Israel was quoted as
saying that “[e]ven though it is a government arm, it is really treated by the marketplace
as a well-managed and well-run modern financial institution.” (Forsythe and Sanderson,
2011). Second, unlike debt issued by other state-owned banks in China, the special
financing bonds issued by the CDB are classified at the same level as sovereign debt by
the government. This is considered one of its biggest competitive advantages. Banks that
buy the bonds can count them at a zero-risk weighting on their balance sheets. The
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao plans to reclassify the CDB as a commercial bank
instead of a policy lender so that the CDB has to compete on an equal footing with other
state-owned banks that now have commercial bank status. That means that CDB would
have to pay more to borrow money. With strong resistance from the CDB, the Chinese
government extended its special financing status through the end of 2012 (Forsythe and
Sanderson, 2011).
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Table 1 China Development Bank’s energy-backed loans

Borrower

Amount

Term

(US$ bn)

(year)

Interest rate

Oil/gas
deliveries to
secure loan**

2005

Rosneft, Russia

6*

6

LIBOR+3.0% (2005)

180 kp/d

LIBOR+0.7% (2006-10)
2008

BANDES, Venezuela

4

3

NA

100 kp/d

2009

Rosneft, Russia

15

20

LIBOR+5.69%

180 kp/d

2009

Transneft, Russia

10

20

LIBOR+5.69%

120 kp/d

2009

Petrobras, Brazil

10

10

LIBOR+2.8%

150-200 kp/d

2009

BANDES, Venezuela

4

3

NA

107-153 kp/d

2009

Turkmengaz, Turkmenistan

4

NA

NA

NA

2010

BANDES, Venezuela

20.6

10

LIBOR+0.5-2.85%

200-300 kp/d

2010

Ministry of Finance, Ecuador

1

4

6.0%

36 kp/d

2011

Turkmengaz, Turkmenistan

4.1

NA

NA

10 bcm

2011

BANDES, Venezuela

4

NA

NA

NA

2011

Ministry of Finance, Ecuador

2

8

6.90%

67.58 kp/d

*

Includes funds from Export-Import Bank of China

**

kb/d = Thousand barrels per day

Source: Downs (2011b).

Associated with these loans are the common claims that Chinese loans to Latin
America have more favorable terms, impose no policy conditions, and have less stringent
environmental guidelines than the loans of international financial institutions and
Western governments. But Gallagher et al. (2012) finds that this is often not the case.
They find that the CDB loans carry more stringent terms than the World Bank loans. In
2010, the CDB offered Argentina a US$10 billion loan at 600 basis points above LIBOR.
The same year, the World Bank Group’s International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) granted Argentina a US$30 million loan with a spread of 85 basis
points. In 2009, the CDB gave Brazil a US$10 billion loan at 280 basis points. The IBRD
gave Brazil a US$43.4 million loan in 2000 at a variable spread of 30–55 basis points.
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China’s Export-Import Bank, by contrast, generally offers lower interest rates
than the U.S. Export-Import Bank. This is mainly because Chinese banks package
commercial financing and development aid differently than their foreign counterparts.
Instead of giving development aid through the CDB, China channels it through China’s
Export-Import Bank. The IBRD and other development banks offer concessional interest
rates as an official form of development aid, while the CDB does not. Despite the CDB’s
“development bank” label, the Chinese bank generally charges borrowers the full cost of
finance. For this reason, Bräutigam (2009) labels the CDB “the development bank that
doesn’t give aid”. It is not surprising, therefore, that the CDB’s interest rates are higher
(Gallagher et al., 2012).
Given that the CDB offers loans at the market-based interest rates on the one hand
and that it imposes no policy conditions on the other, to mitigate loan risks, Chinese
banks do require equipment purchases and sometimes oil sale agreements with borrowers
as a sort of collateral in kind. This method allows China to loan to less creditworthy
borrowers. As the CDB founder Chen Yuan states, backing loans with oil shipments
“effectively keeps risks to a minimum level” (Forsythe and Sanderson, 2011). The risk
mitigation of loans-for-oil seems to explain why the CDB was able to offer the US$20
billion loan to Venezuela at a floating rate of 50-285 basis points over LIBOR, only a
fraction of its 935 basis point cost in sovereign debt markets (Gallagher et al., 2012). To
date, this kind of lending seems to work well for borrowing countries in which they need
less costly Chinese inputs and equipment to develop their own energy, mining,
infrastructure, transportation and housing sectors. We will discuss this issue further in the
next section.

3.3 Loans for oil and gas deals
Using loan-for-oil and loan-for-gas deals to secure long-term supplies is not a Chinese
invention. Japan gave China loans for its oil as early as the 1970s. This type of deal is not
new for China and has been used by Chinese NOCs for some time. In 2004, CNPC
loaned the Russian oil producer Rosneft US$6 billion for 180 kb/d of oil supplies through
2010 (Downs, 2011b). But such deals are dwarfed by the deal with Russia in 2009. China

17
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2012

17

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 699 [2012]

and Russia had been discussing a cross-border pipeline for crude oil since the early 1990s,
but were not able to finalize a deal. Leveraging its relative financial strength at a time
when most other big economies were in recession, China eventually struck its longawaited mega loan-for-oil deal with Russia on 17 February 2009. Under this long-term
deal, the CDB lends US$25 billion to Rosneft, Russia’s biggest oil producer, and
Transneft, its oil pipeline operator. In exchange, Russia will provide China with an
additional 15 million tons of crude oil a year between 2011 and 2030, which represents
about 300 kb/d for 20 years, or nearly 7% of China’s volume of oil imports in 2009,
through a new pipeline, which began making commercial deliveries on 1 January 2011.
The deal not only provides the two Russian oil companies with much needed credit, but
also helps Russia to secure customers and reduce its dependence on Western European
customers. Another notable deal is a US$10 billion loan agreement with the Brazilian
state-owned oil giant Petroleo Brasileiro SA, known as Petrobras, the biggest deal in
Central and South America. This loan is to help Petrobras develop newly discovered
offshore oil reserves, which promise to convert Brazil into a major world oil exporter.
Under the terms of the 10-year loan from the CDB, Petrobras will supply Sinopec 150
kb/d in 2009, rising to 200 kb/d for another nine years from 2010 to 2019 (Ma, 2009; The
Economist, 2010).
It should be pointed out that loan-for-oil and -gas deals are not without risk.
Contracts could be voided in case of a change of government. Resource-rich countries
might fail to supply the promised quantity. Moreover, because the oil is not collateral for
the loan, if the borrowers threaten to cut off the supply of oil, lenders cannot seize extra
oil or oil revenue to compensate for potential losses (Jacob, 2010; Jiang and Sinton,
2011). Therefore, loan-for-oil and-gas deals are not the preferred method of the NOCs to
gain foreign supplies. Good quality assets are, however, rarely for sale these days, and
even if they were, Chinese NOCs might not be able to fairly win the bids, as foreign
governments have blocked many of Chinese NOCs’ attempts to buy oil fields. Given
these constraints, loan-for-oil and -gas deals serve as a second-best strategy for China to
diversify its oil supply (Arnson and Davidow, 2011; Jiang and Sinton, 2011; The
Economist, 2010).
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In the midst of the global financial crisis, China further diversified its energy
import mix via loan-for-oil and gas-deals. Chinese state-owned banks made loans worth
US$77 billion to nine different oil and gas-producing countries in 2009 and 2010, all of
which are located outside the Middle East (Jiang and Sinton, 2011). Many outside
observers, explicitly or implicitly, assume that these deals grant Chinese NOCs a discount.
Under this assumption, borrowers simply send oil to China at a preset price to pay back
the loan, and thus might lose out as oil prices rise. This is a misunderstanding of how this
kind of deal works,6 and a misreading of the evidence. Chinese NOCs have no bargaining
on prices, and all the deals are linked to market prices, not quantities of oil. Russia, Brazil
and Venezuela all sell their oil to China at market prices (Downs, 2011b; Gallagher,
Irwin and Koleski, 2012; Jiang and Sinton, 2011). These market-based arrangements will
ensure deliveries of oil, as the temptation to default on supply contracts if the market
price were to rise above a negotiated price would be very strong. The difficulties seen in
other commodity markets where long term contracts sit beside spot markets – such as
iron ore – illustrate this reality.
Chinese NOCs, however, with the support from the Chinese government and
backed with Chinese policy banks, did take advantage of stricken foreign companies in
the global financial crisis to enable them to reach otherwise unlikely deals and receive
long-term oil and gas supplies. Moreover, these deals, backed with the CDB’s loans,
required the borrowers to buy and hire from China to mitigate loan risks,7 despite no
policy conditions being imposed (Gallagher et al., 2012). The agreement with Petrobras
stipulates that US$3 billion of the US$10 billion loan must be used to purchase oil
equipment from China. China’s US$10 billion loan to Argentina in 2010 is to buy
Chinese trains. Thus, this loan is actually a credit line for Chinese railway companies to
invest in 10 separate rail projects in Argentina, with the money effectively staying in
6

In a typical deal involving the CDB, one Chinese NOC and a foreign borrower (say, a
foreign oil company), the CDB provides the loan to a foreign borrower, and opens an
account to the borrower. Then the Chinese NOC buys the oil from the borrower at market
prices, and deposits its payments into the borrower’s designated account at the CDB. In
this way, the foreign borrower is obligated to sell oil to the Chinese NOC, and the CDB
would be guaranteed to receive payments to repay itself for the loan.
7
Western development loans tend to attach the transparency, seniority clauses and reform
requirements in an effort to reduce loan risks.
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China. Half of the US$ 20.6 billion loan the CDB granted to the Venezuela’s Bank of
Economic and Social Development is denominated in Chinese Renminbi, which locks
Venezuela into buying Chinese equipment and hiring Chinese firms (De Córdoba, 2011;
Downs, 2011a; Hall, 2010). Clearly, in addition to securing oil supplies, these deals also
serve the government goal of creating new export markets for Chinese companies and at
the same time reduce their exposure to default risks and the borrowers’ potential for
misuse and corruption (Bräutigam, 2009). These borrowers find purchase requirements
attached to Chinese loans less objectionable because they seek to build up their energy,
mining, infrastructure, transportation, and housing sectors inexpensively using Chinese
inputs and equipment.8

3.4 Chinese NOCs’ equity oil shares
In the early 2000s, the Chinese government adopted the so-called going-out policies to
help state-owned companies, including Chinese NOCs, to achieve their ambition to grow
and build global businesses. Arguably the government also sees supporting Chinese
NOCs to make oil and natural gas mergers and acquisitions (M&A) overseas as a way to
diversify its foreign exchange reserves to higher-yielding assets away from low-yielding
financial instruments such as U.S. Treasury Bonds (Downs, 2011a). As a result of the
going-out policy supported by Chinese policy banks, these NOCs now have equity stakes
in production in 20 countries. By the first quarter of 2010, NOCs’ overseas equity shares
had reached 1.36 mbpd, nearly one-third of China’s net imports in 2009 (Jiang and Sinton,
2011).

8

This depends on the requirements of the borrowers. Mexico, Colombia, and Peru, the
traditional borrowers of the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, are
undertaking projects outside the energy, mining, infrastructure, transportation, and
housing sectors for which Chinese purchase requirements would be a burden. They find
the transparency and reform requirements of Western loans less costly than Chinese
equipment. Brazil and Argentina accept Western loans where they find it acceptable to
comply with Western standards. At the same time, they take on Chinese oil, mining, and
train loans because they are willing to use Chinese inputs and have little objection to the
purchase requirements (Gallagher et al, 2012).
20
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper699

20

Zhang: Why Are the Stakes So High? Misconceptions and Misunderstand

With oil as an internationally traded commodity, China’s endeavors to expand its
global search and production of oil are constantly confronted with the issue of whether
this strategy is superior to simply buying oil in open markets because of concerns about
Chinese NOCs’ overbidding and making investment losses abroad.
The Chinese oil companies have a history of overpaying for equity positions
(Balfour, 2002).9 Because China has viewed paying a higher price than competitors to
secure energy resources to be more of a national security issue than a pure business
decision (Bradsher, 2005), such bidding wars between Chinese companies and their
rivalries have further intensified the tendency of Chinese oil companies to pay far above
what other competitors offer. Prior to the credit crisis, China had grabbed these deals by
overbidding by at least 10% more than its competitor from India did. In January 2006, the
CNOOC bought a 45% stake in the Akpo offshore oil and gas field in Nigeria for
US$2.27 billion by outbidding the competitor, India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas
Corp (ONGC), which submitted a bid of US$2 billion but withdrew after India’s cabinet
raised concerns about the risks involved (Aiyar, 2006; Masaki, 2006). In August 2005,
the CNPC paid US$4.18 billion to acquire Canadian oil company PetroKazakhstan,
making it China’s largest foreign acquisition ever at that time (Bradsher, 2005).
Originally, the CNPC offered US$3.6 billion. With an Indian consortium (ONGC-Mittal)
bid of US$3.8 billion, the CNPC hiked its offer to US$4.18 billion to secure the deal
(Basu, 2005).
The financial and credit crisis and the decline in global oil demand have turned
the oil industry into a buyer’s market, however temporarily. Should the Chinese oil
majors be able to make better M&A deals than those prior to the credit crisis? On 24 June
2009, Sinopec made a C$8.27 billion (US$7.22 billion) takeover bid for the international

9

Overpaying for acquisitions does not apply to China alone. Areva, a French state-owned
nuclear energy group, is reported to have overpaid in its US$2.7 billion purchase in 2007
of UraMin, a Canadian start-up firm with mining assets in Namibia, resulting in a huge
operating loss for 2011. In the rush to snap up uranium deposits at the time when
expectations of a nuclear renaissance caused uranium prices to soar, Areva failed to do
enough metallurgical due-diligence on UraMin’s mines. The reserves in Namibia turned
out to be smaller and less easily extractable than expected. This was compounded by a
plunging uranium price after the Fukushima nuclear accident, thus further reducing the
deposits’ value (The Economist, 2012b).
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oil and gas exploration company Addax Petroleum, making it the largest overseas
takeover by a Chinese company. The takeover would have given Sinopec access to
Addax’s stakes in oil fields off the coast of West Africa, as well as in Iraq (Zhang,
2010b). The Korea National Oil Corporation also bid for Addax, offering USS$6.9
billion (The Chosun IIbo, 2009). Sinopec offered US$7.2 billion to win the deal. So,
Sinopec only overbid its competitor by 4.6%, far less than the overbidding of at least
10% it had made in those aforementioned deals prior to the credit crisis. Measured in
ways, however, the story differs. Sinopec’s offer is equivalent to US$34 a barrel of
proved reserves and US$14 a barrel of proved and probable reserves. The African
transaction average in 2007, when the average crude price was similar to the prices in
2009 at a time when this deal was made, was US$14.40 a barrel for proved reserves and
US$9.90 for proved and probable reserves, respectively. On a proved basis, the 2007
average suggests US$3.1 billion total value for the deal. Therefore, US$7.2 billion
implies a 135% premium (Xu, 2009). In December 2008, Sinopec paid C$2.1 billion to
acquire Tanganyika Oil, a Canadian company that owned oil fields in Syria. The 95
percent takeover marked the first time a Chinese company had almost complete
ownership of a formerly North American oil and gas firm. The C$2.1 billion deal had
been initiated when the price of oil was at US$90 a barrel. When the price fell to US$40 a
barrel by December of that year, the offer was generally seen as overpriced. The
company still went ahead with the purchase (Vaidyanathan, 2012). On 8 October 2011,
Sinopec bought Daylight Energy, a Canadian oil and natural gas producer, for about
C$2.2 billion in cash. Under the terms of the deal, Sinopec offered C$10.08 a share. That
is more than double Daylight’s closing price of C$4.59 on the last trading day, and 43.9%
above the 60-day weighted average trading price. China’s largest refiner paid very high
premium over its share price to fully acquire Daylight Energy (De La Merced, 2011).
It is important to note, however, that the higher bid does not always win in a
politically charged industry like energy. The CNOOC in 2005 failed to acquire Unocal
for US$18.5 billion, although it topped Chevron’s bid of US$16.4 billion. In the end,
Chevron won the deal based on other factors. This overpaying might partly reflect a need
to overcome the kinds of political difficulties that hampered Chinese state-owned
companies’ overseas takeover attempts in recent years. Nevertheless, the Chinese NOCs

22
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper699

22

Zhang: Why Are the Stakes So High? Misconceptions and Misunderstand

are more reluctant than in the past to overpay for assets for at least two reasons. First, the
Chinese NOCs have moved up technology and project management learning curves that
the IOCs have dominated and have become increasingly sophisticated and capable
internationally. Second, they have been tightening up their premiums by examining the
financial returns of their bids. The CNOOC has started using a financial metric system
that allows it to price its bids more accurately. Now even the larger national oil
companies like PetroChina, Sinopec, have started to follow the CNOOC’s path
(Vaidyanathan, 2012). A recent study by the International Energy Agency uncovered no
evidence of systematic or intentional overpayment associated with recent acquisitions
(Jiang and Sinton, 2011). However, this is still an issue open to debate, and there is still
disagreement. Some American analysts, like Herberg (2012), believe that Chinese NOCs
continue to pay significant premiums to acquire overseas assets. Derek Scissors of the
conservative Heritage Foundation was also quoted as saying that Chinese companies
usually pay 20 to 30% more than other companies to secure assets (Vaidyanathan, 2012).
The premiums were generally seen as necessary to keep shareholders happy and quell
any political concerns given anti-China sentiment in certain circles. Eventually, whether
assets are worth the premium price in the long run depends on whether and how far the
value of oil and gas properties will rise.
Another issue is related to wide concerns about huge losses incurred when
investing abroad. A study by China University of Petroleum suggests that China’s “big
three” oil corporations (CNPC, Sinopec, CNOOC) had invested in some 144 overseas
projects totaling US$70 billion by the end of 2010, but two thirds of such overseas
investments suffered losses (Fu and Lin, 2012; Oxford Analytica, 2011). Given that these
SOEs can cover overseas losses through their access to capital at home, this has created a
perception of these SOEs as irresponsible users of state funds.
It can be argued that economic rationales can take the backseat or be second order
if the NOCs’ oil production outside China can help to improve China’s energy security.
Question is then: are the Chinese NOCs’ equity oil shares improving China’s energy
security?
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First of all, as mentioned above, sending Chinese NOCs’ equity oil shares back
home would face the same U.S.-led oil blockade problem if it were to emerge – even
though this paper is skeptical about the effectiveness of any blockade, as argued above.
Second, China’s oil imports rapidly outpace the equity oil production of the
Chinese NOCs and their ability to acquire oil assets and accumulate investments in equity
production abroad, so the equity oil strategy is hopelessly inadequate as a critical energy
security strategy (Herberg, 2012).
Third, it is widely understood that Chinese NOCs’ willingness to overpay is to a
large extent because these state-owned oil majors are obligated to guarantee China’s
energy security. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that the Chinese NOCs
necessarily send their equity oil production back to China. Instead, the NOCs apparently
prefer to let market conditions decide whether it is shipped back to China or whether it is
sold to regional or international markets at the best price, as other IOCs do (Jiang and
Sinton, 2011; Kennedy, 2011). Prior to completion of the Kazakhstan‐China oil pipeline
in 2009, the Chinese equity oil from the Aktobe field in Kazakhstan was known to be
transported via the pipeline to Atyrau to be sold on the international market. Even with
the new pipeline in operation, some of CNPC’s equity oil from Kazakhstan is still not
shipped home. CNPC International, the exploration and production arm for CNPC’s
overseas production, determines whether it would be profitable to sell the oil that it
produces to China National United Oil Corporation. This CNPC trading company also
evaluates whether buying crude oil locally close to the pipeline starting point (Atasu,
prior to 2009) is more economical than buying crude produced at Aktobe by CNPC’s
exploration and production subsidiary and transporting it to Atasu (Jiang and Sinton,
2011). China’s equity production in Venezuela has also not been shipped back to China.
This is mainly because it is too costly to do that given the long distance involved, and
partly because Venezuelan heavy crude had not been compatible with the existing
Chinese refining capabilities before PetroChina teamed up with the Venezuelan stateowned oil company, PDVSA, to build a refinery to process this type of crude oil in
Jieyang, Guangdong (Jiang and Sinton, 2011).
Fourth, the available evidence does not suggest that oil produced from the
Chinese NOCs would be either cheaper or more available to Chinese consumers in a
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supply crisis. Indeed, these NOCs have shown little inclination to grant Chinese
customers a discount when prices are high (Kennedy, 2011). In fact, the NOCs responded
to rising crude oil prices prior to 2008 by reducing supplies of refined products to the
Chinese market, resulting in widespread shortages at the pump, since the government’s
controls over the prices of oil products did not allow them to pass their rising crude costs
on to customers (Downs, 2010).
In the meantime, Chinese investments in oil fields overseas do help to pump more
oil out of the fields and enlarge the overall availability of oil on the world market. But
this is seen as beneficial not only for Chinese consumers but also for other global
consumers (Zhang, 2007 and 2010b). Taking these points together, Chinese NOCs’
efforts to secure overseas oil and gas supplies are not a threat to U.S. or Western energy
security because Chinese investments in oil fields overseas enlarge the overall
availability of oil on the world market. But they do not unambiguously improve China’s
energy security either because the NOCs do not necessarily send their equity oil
production back to China (Herberg, 2012; Kennedy, 2011, Jiang and Sinton, 2011).

4. Concluding remarks
China is the world’s largest energy consumer and the world’s largest energy producer.
China has relied and will continue to rely heavily on domestic energy resources to fuel its
economic development. This makes China different from many other large economies.
China is a key player on both the demand and supply sides. Those who hold the “China
energy threat” view and blame Chinese oil demand and imports for high oil prices often
tend to neglect this basic fact.
However, this is not to deny the fact that China is increasingly depending on
imported oil. Indeed, this, combined with heavy reliance on the Strait of Malacca to ship
imported oil to China, poses distinct security challenges for China. Given the strategic
importance of the Strait of Malacca and China’s limited influence on the waterway,
China has taken great efforts on both the demand and supply sides to cope with the
perceived “Malacca dilemma” and to enhance its energy security. China’s responses on
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the demand side are well formulated and justified, but the same cannot be said on the
supply side. Some measures, for example, developing its own strategic petroleum
reserves, are well taken, but others, such as NOCs-hijacked going-out policies and
exacerbation of disruption of oil supply, are open to debate. They might be considered
misguided and not well founded.
Needless to say, NOC expansion is a positive development for the companies
themselves. If NOCs’ deals improve China’s energy security then it is reasonable to
allow profitability to be sought as a second priority. If, however, that first condition is not
met then the entire strategy is questionable because many NOCs’ deals are not justified
on economic grounds alone.
China’s aggressive global expansion to acquire resources is often perceived as a
threat. This misreads the evidence because Chinese NOCs’ efforts to secure overseas oil
and gas supplies do not threaten U.S. or Western energy security. Most oil produced by
Chinese NOCs abroad was sold in international markets, benefiting not only Chinese
consumers but also other global consumers. This perceived threat could, however, lead
the Chinese NOCs to overpay in deals, and drive up the world prices of resources
compared with what would otherwise have been the case. Being aggressive and keeping
higher profiles than is strictly necessary, in the name of energy security, the Chinese
NOCs are complicating China’s foreign relations in sensitive regions of the world and
could hijack Chinese government’s going-out policies to increase their own profits but at
the expense of China’s overall national interests.
In the context of discussions on China’s energy security, there is a tendency to
over-estimate potential disruptions to oil supply or take a pessimistic view of the stability
of energy trade. This largely reflects mistrust of global oil markets; but evidence suggests
that market-based energy contracts are long lasting, prevailing over ideological
differences, wars or politically motivated actions. Evidence suggests that under the
commercial contracts the former Soviet Union exported natural gas to Western Europe
virtually unimpeded even during the Cold War era; however, brothers can be brought into
conflicts if one does not follow market rules. This was clearly reflected by natural gas
disputes between Russia and the Ukraine in 2005, despite the fact that the latter was the
former Soviet republic and they remain close to each other. Russia attempted to halt the
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supply of natural gas to the Ukraine because of a disagreement on a payment of its
natural gas sold to the Ukraine. Russia supplied the natural gas to the Ukraine at a price
of US$50 per thousand cubic meters at that time while its gas exported to Western
Europe was at a price nearly five times that (Mao, 2006). Clearly, the root cause of this
dispute was politics because this supply of natural gas was not based on a commercial
contract but rather on a political deal. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that one side
was not going to stick to the deal when it saw changing political conditions on the other
side. In this case, Russia viewed the Ukraine’s notable trend towards autonomy and
political independence away from Russia.
Moreover, oil embargos led by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) are most unlikely to be repeated, first of all for the sake of the OPEC
itself. Even if undertaken, they would not be as damaging as in the 1970s because the
major energy-consuming economies are much less energy-intensive and have diversified
their primary energy supply and have built up their emergency oil stockpile to deal with
any physical disruptions to supply. Furthermore, using resources as a political weapon is
condemned internationally. Russia has been heavily criticized for its continued
differential treatment of the former Soviet republics in terms of the price of its supplied
natural gas. It supplies natural gas at a low price to those republics politically close to
Russia but at a high price to those politically close to the West. While China denied the
embargo threat, it received heavy criticism of its alleged embargo of rare earth exports to
Japan after Japan’s arrest of a Chinese trawler captain in the Diaoyu islands in September
2010.
It thus follows that both China and Western countries need to de-politicize
China’s global quest for energy security. Western politicians need to recognize that their
rhetoric in relation to China’s efforts to secure energy supplies overseas – which paints it
as a major threat - has done nothing but intensify China’s fear that they might seek to
deny China’s access to the oil it needs for development. China needs to reconsider its
stance of distrusting global oil markets and to recognize that the reliance on aggressive
acquisitions of overseas oil fields and equity oil production has been of little help in
strengthening its energy security. Just like other oil importers, China’s energy security
depends increasingly and deeply on the stability of global oil markets and reliable and
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growing oil supplies to the market. Thus, China and other major oil importing countries
share profound common interests in maintaining and strengthening the stability of global
oil markets and reducing the chance of potential disruptions to oil supply and the
resulting damaging oil price shocks.
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